WHY IT’S SO HARD FOR THE U.S. AND IRAN TO MAKE A DEAL

John Kerry meets with Iran's Vice President

By Rebecca Emrick
Staff Writer

Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the relationship between the United States and Iran has been rocky at best. One aspect of the rocky relationship between the two countries has been Iran’s nuclear program. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was ratified in 1970 was created in order to outline that “countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament; countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them; and all countries can access peaceful nuclear technology.” According to the NPT, all countries are allowed to use nuclear capabilities, but only for peaceful purposes, such as energy production. However, states are not allowed to acquire nuclear capabilities past the point of peaceful purposes because that would mean that these nations could create nuclear weapons. Iran has not signed onto this treaty, and therefore didn’t formally commit to pursuing purely peaceful nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, in 2003 there was evidence that Iran had pursued and successfully created enriched uranium past what is needed for peaceful applications. However, Iran claimed that their enrichment of uranium was and has stayed at peaceful levels and that the evidence brought before the International Atomic Energy Agency was fabricated because they claimed that “the source of the uranium is imported equipment.”

Despite the circumstantial evidence that Iran was enriching uranium past peaceful uses, the U.S. Department of State has stated that “in response to Iran’s continued illicit nuclear activities, the United States and other countries have imposed unprecedented sanctions” in order to “prevent its further progress in prohibited nuclear activities, as well as to persuade Tehran to address the international community’s concerns about its nuclear program.” Although these were not the first sanctions ever imposed on Iran by the U.S., the Iranian government and economy has nonetheless felt the economic pressure. According to the World Bank “the business environment [in Iran] remains a challenge with the country ranking 130th out of the 189 countries surveyed in the 2015 Doing Business Report” Iran’s private sector isn’t as successful as it should be for being the second largest economy in the Middle East. Iran is being economically challenged by the sanctions being imposed on them in the private sector because private businesses are extremely limited with regard to whom they can do business with.

On the other hand, Iran has seen economic growth from 1.7 percent in 2013 to 3 percent in 2014 “as a result of the temporary and partial easing of sanctions imposed on Iran’s oil exports.” As a result of some sanctions being lifted from Iran, their overall economic growth has almost doubled in one year. This is no easy feat, and it shows that the sanctions that have been imposed on Iran greatly affect their economy. So if Iran’s economy has nearly doubled in the last year, why would they want to work with the U.S. to lift more sanctions? A big ticket economic problem that Iran faces is unemployment. In Iran “unemployment remains elevated and is expected to be a central challenge for the government”, which gives the Iranian Government motivation to work toward some kind of nuclear agreement with the U.S. in order to lift further sanctions in the hope of creating more jobs for Iranian citizens.

On Jan. 21, 2015 U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken claimed that the U.S. “still [has] a credible chance of reaching a deal that is in the best interest of America’s security, as well as the security of our allies” which was the first time that the U.S. had publicly stated that it was in its own national interest to cooperate and work with Iran on some kind of nuclear arrangement. Since then, the U.S. and Iranian diplomats have come to a preliminary agreement (the deal isn’t sealed until the end of June) which was made available to the Ayatollah Khamenei. Unfortunately the Ayatollah’s reaction to the nuclear deal has been less than satisfactory. For example, in a press conference in Tehran the Ayatollah demanded that economic sanctions be lifted as soon as the negotiations’ final papers were signed and that military sites were completely off limits to foreign inspectors and inquiries. These are two sticking points for the U.S. It is important to both President Obama and John Kerry that the U.S. lifts the economic sanctions on Iran gradually so that they are able to ensure that Iran has been “[complying] with its obligations” to reduce its stockpile of uranium so that they cannot enrich it for nuclear weapons. Additionally, most nuclear sites are also military bases, so if no inspectors were allowed in those facilities than there could be no guarantee that Iran was “following through on their commitment to vastly reduce their uranium stockpile.”

The Obama Administration is also facing criticism from the GOP, and their disbelief that Iran will continue to enrich uranium at levels that are in compliance for peaceful purposes. John Boehner has publicly stated that “it would be naïve to suggest the Iranian regime will not continue to use its nuclear program, and any economic relief, to further destabilize the region.” Members of the GOP are reluctant to allow a deal with Iran to go forward because they are skeptical that Iran will hold up their end of the bargain and enrich uranium at the appropriate levels for peaceful purposes. John Boehner also invited Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, to congress where he expressed concern over the deal with Iran and said in a statement “this is a bad deal — a very bad deal”. John Boehner wanted to invite Netanyahu to Congress to speak in order to show how this nuclear deal would affect Israel, a long standing ally of the U.S. Were Iran to go back on their agreement with the U.S., a nuclear armed Iran would be a large threat in the Middle East weapons and would most likely trigger an arms race in the Middle East. Iran and Israel are known for having an extremely tense relationship, so if Iran were to have nuclear weapons, one can assume that it would push their relationship over the edge. Boehner and the GOP wanted to use Netanyahu’s speech in order to show Obama what could go wrong if the U.S. decided to go through with a nuclear deal with Iran.

In Iran, the Ayatollah claims that he neither supports nor opposes the nuclear negotiations, he did end his speech saying that he “has never been optimistic about negotiations with America” which implies that he may be leaning away from supporting any kind of nuclear deal with the U.S. Although the President of Iran is directly elected by the people of Iran, it is the Ayatollah that has the final say in political matters. If the Ayatollah doesn’t agree with or support a bill, then the bill won’t pass. It will be important to take into consideration what the Ayatollah wants from these nuclear talks in order for the talks to be ultimately successful.

Image by the U.S. Department of State

TRUST YOUR NEIGHBOR

Panmunjom on the Korean Border

By James Kim
Staff Writer

A mother often punishes her child whenever he misbehaves and rewards him if he deserves it. So goes the ideology of Trustpolitik, the new South Korean policy on containing North Korean aggression. Since Park Geun-hye became South Korea’s first female president in 2012, Trustpolitik has offered a much more assertive approach to Kim Jong-un’s continuation of his father’s policies of nuclear extortion. If the North tries to provoke the South, President Park will cut off aid to her neighbor. This is a reversal of her predecessor’s Sunshine Policy, which was a more conciliatory approach, usually with no strings attached. Nonetheless, Park promises to help alleviate North Korea’s economic woes and reaffirm existing agreements if they can prove their commitment to the truce. Park’s inauguration address spoke of “a trust-building process, for Koreans [to live] prosperous and freer lives” [1].

On October 23rd, Lee Jong-joo, a representative of the South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, visited UC San Diego to explain what Trustpolitik means for South Korea’s future diplomacy with its northern neighbor. She pointed out in a slideshow that Kim Jong-un uses the nuclear game as a show of force to both the outside world and to inner party dissenters who question the young leader’s ability to rule. For the North Korean leader, nukes are merely a short-term political asset to a long-term economic goal as his nation still endures a devastating famine, not to mention the recession that has ailed the Communist bloc since the fall of the U.S.S.R. [2]. Obtaining nuclear weapons provides him not only with a cheap method for national security (as opposed to feeding and paying a burgeoning military), but also leverage in diplomatic talks with both the Republic of Korea across the 48th Parallel and the United States. Nonetheless, the recent flare-ups this spring show how precarious the double-edged sword of nuclear diplomacy has proven to be for Kim Jong-un, who not only incurred the wrath of the U.S. military, but also increased tensions with his only ally, China, which does not want an unstable nuclear-armed regime on its border [3].

Continuing in her lecture, Lee mentioned how the city of Kaesong represents a critical link between the two Koreas. Located inside North Korea near the Demilitarized Zone, the Kaesong Industrial Region helps stabilize the North Korean economy while providing South Korea with a source of physical labor for its chaebol, or major corporations [4]. The area’s closing during the spring tensions proved to be one of first tests for the Trustpolitik policy, as President Park refused to send back her economic advisors until North Korea could ensure it would not cause another international stir. She even warned “if North Korea launches another strike, then Seoul must respond immediately to ensure Pyongyang understands the costs of military provocation.” Since Kim Jong-un originally closed the economic zone, President Park wanted to see how long North Korea could stomach the loss of a vital part of its economy as well as handle a miscalculation by its leader. It appears that Kaesong was more important to the North then to the South, as the area was reopened in August and the North gave compensation to South Korean businesses that lost profit from its closing.

Trustpolitik survived its first trial, but it has yet to encounter a situation that actually involves loss of life, such as the sinking of the Cheonan that occurred during the administration of Park’s predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, a hardliner who refused to escalate the protests against North Korean aggression. It may be that the new policy will face rougher waves as Kim’s nuclear policy does not appear to be slowing down. However, Trustpolitik’s ability to extract concessions in its first major test still shows that this policy has had a fortunate start on its road to détente.

1. Lee, Jong-joo. Trustpolitik: A Way Forward on the Korean Peninsula. IR/PS: UCSD. 23 Oct. 2013. Event.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

Image by Joe Doe