DETRIMENTAL DEVELOPMENT: HOW INTERNATIONAL AID ORGANIZATIONS FAILED POST-EARTHQUAKE HAITI

By Jasmine Minato
Staff Writer

2015 marks the 5th year anniversary of a 7.0 magnitude earthquake, which took over 250,000 lives, including over 18,000 highly skilled professionals and destroyed a majority of homes, schools, hospitals, and government buildings in Haiti’s capital of Port Au Prince (PAP). The monstrous natural disaster was ranked by the U.S. Geological Survey in the top 10 worst natural disturbances in all of human history. A self-proclaimed novice expert of Haitian history, yet confirmed avid researcher on the Caribbean island’s cultural developments and colonial periods, Ivan Evans (who is also the newly appointed Eleanor Roosevelt College provost), hosted a seminar called “Haiti After the Earthquake” on February 18 in the Cross Cultural Center’s Communidad Room at the University of California, San Diego. Guest speakers included Literature department Professor Sarah Johnson, UC Berkeley’s School of Environmental Engineering Professor Mary Cameiro, and Dickinson College American Studies Professor Jerry Philogene. Although Haiti has relatively avoided recent news headlines, commotion regarding international aid has not. The phenomenon of aid organizations flocking to regions struggling with rebuilding post-disaster continues to be a relevant headline. However, the role of international aid organizations in the reconstruction process deserves a second look. In particular, should organizations dictate whether a nation should enforce recovery or development policy post disaster reconstruction? In Haiti’s case, international aid organizations dictated the choice to fund long term public projects during an emergency disaster crippling the nation’s ability to re-build on it’s own. Pipeline projects were promoted as a recovery priority for aid cohorts. Is the fundamental intention of aid changing or was Haiti cheated out of relief aid?

How is Haiti remembered?
Haiti is well known as a poor nation with the “lowest per capita GDP in the Western Hemisphere,” according to Literature Professor Sarah Johnson. However, she continued, within “Haiti’s history contains the highs and lows of human emotion,” from which we can all remember Haiti by if we are willing to dig past a common single narrative strangling the nation’s true exceptional resiliency. Often overlooked is Haiti’s ability to overcome overwhelming circumstances. For example, in 1804 Toussaint L’Ouverture, a free slave and Haitian rebellion leader led a successful populist revolt against French colonial military forces leading to national independence. The logic of Haiti’s resilience lies in an ability of its people and it’s culture to adapt to renewal or as Johnson calls it “building from the ground up.” For most of the 17th century, Haiti was an empirical trade frontier where crops and eventually people were stolen by European colonizers. Haiti was forced to support foreign prosperity at the cost of domestic degradation. Post independence, social order was an anomaly where 60,000 Haitians lived as free people and half a million Haitians were still enslaved as laborers. Johnson asks “how could Haiti rule a society with slaves led by free people?” Her answer is years of extreme violence and bloody revolutions between different classes of people. Colonization caused unnatural violence and social disruption in Haiti. An intervention of foreign powers caused Haiti to become chaotic. Foreign intervention today no longer looks like colonization, but takes form in international aid. International aid organizations are pre-occupied with planning long-term business developments than providing emergency humanitarian relief. In 2010, disaster recovery became an investment opportunity for international aid organizations swarming PAP. Haiti has a spirit of resilience and a unique history of survival in the face of uncertain and tremulous conditions, but in the aftermath of an event of total geological destruction, was Haiti’s spirit of resilience enough to recover? Reliance on outside organizations caused Haiti to fall into an economic chokehold where recovery was possible, but with coercion. An immediate need in the aftermath of destruction would be water, shelter, and search crews, however, for Haiti commercial development as a recovery plan seemed to attract aid organizations.

How did Haiti fall victim of disaster capitalism?
To understand Haiti as a victim of deceitful aid, turn to theories of aid policy. Dr. Dambisa Moyo, who received a doctorate of Economics from Oxford and Master’s in government from Harvard’s Kennedy school, describes why foreign aid innately destroys the longevity of a nation in her 2010 published novel “Dead Aid.” Moyo’s novel can best explain how recovery policy and development policy are completely separate animals. Development policy is a geopolitical hold for advanced nations to dictate poor nations economically and divide physically. Thus, advanced nations embark on economic colonization by forcing business assets abroad. Recovery policy is either free or loaned immediate relief and often descends into a vicious cycle of aid, leaving a receiving nation addicted. Short phases of aid cause a culture of dependency, which ensures underdevelopment as well as economic failure even in the poorest of aid dependent nations. Recovery policy is a tool of international relief, yet used often without empathy for cultural survival. The very nature of aid is changing from fiscal loans between governments to NGOs sending humanitarian cohorts to supply emergency relief. However, considered an outlier is international aid organizations choosing to impose development policy in Haiti. Moyo formulates that development policy is strongest when a nation has equal economic and political leverage with foreign interventionists, but vindictive when a nation relying on aid is dependent on the hand which feeds it to ensure economic survival. Only nations with similar economic power should work multilaterally to mutually enforce development policy, but where a weaker state and powerful state work together, often the latter will be deceitful. The benefits will be asymmetrical and impose an agenda of development favoring the more advanced nation.

How did international aid organizations deceive Haiti?
Mary Cameiro, a world renowned expert on international post-disaster recovery, volunteered as an academic professional to join a recovery plan committee in Haiti in 2010. She says, “Being an academic in a room full of land developers, I felt as if I were in the twilight zone.” She was blindsided when she learned the true intentions of international aid organizations being more concerned with property licensing and land ownership rather than ensuring humanitarian aid to residents suffering from trauma. Camerio recalls that residents refused to remove rubble piles from the street, possibly knowing that land plot once belonged to them; a space where their business once stood. The beginning of territorial expansion processes began. Rubble piles were forcefully removed in order to build infrastructure in the city against the will of the Haiti residents. Camerio also noted that foreign aid development controlled by U.S. AID, IDB, the French Government, and the Clinton Foundation had no sort of common agenda and because of their disjointed goals to begin economic and social recovery. Chosen as one representative to oversee land-transferring committees, Camerio emphasized that fiscal investment in land property just was not normal for organizations that would support recovery in the face of disaster. In small meeting rooms, Camerio was an academic amongst “representatives” from aid organizations who claimed to be in Haiti to support recovery processes, but land developers were on the phone making business deals. She witnessed residents with honest intentions to protect their property, lose everything to a room of developers representing wealthy foreign organizations fighting for land. Who knows how many properties were stolen from residents because of the intervention in foreign aid. What is certain is PAP became a victim of disaster capitalism. Camerio recalls thousands of residents with missing family members and even more residents concerned about what to do next about their destroyed homes. It was perplexing that international aid organizations send land developers and business partners rather than emergency relief cohorts given a frantic outcry of the local residents. Without human security, disaster victims often resort to refugee seeking and migration. In Haiti’s case, many international aid organizations had no empathy of cultural survival, only a hunger to conquer and build.

Camerio says “one of the worst outcomes of the destruction was the loss of government records because land property licenses were completely unknown” and now, land was vulnerable for foreign developers. Haitian families who once owned stores in PAP had to give up that space for a school or new vocational resource center to be built. This type of development is infrastructure for future sustainability not emergency relief, or as Camiero says, “10 steps ahead of what really needed to be addressed as far a recovery policy was concerned. The immediate need was for survival and safety, not buildings and institutions.” While international organizations set up shop to build schools, life in the campsites for residents who had lost their homes was unsafe, unstable, and to the rest of the world, blue tent life looked like a dangerous war zone. Residents were put in danger due to enforced international aid. Crime was high as emergency relief supplies such as medical kits and blankets were stolen daily. “Children were abducted at night, in the middle of the day, and in the early morning in part because UN peacekeeping troops had militarized certain parts of PAP as regional zones and were too busy chasing organized crime” says Camerio. Mothers lost their children with no record of which part of the city their children might have been taken to or which blue tent their child may be in as tent rotation was a common trait of camp life. Even more bizarre, Cameiro explains that the U.S. military taking over Haiti’s national airport only because someone or something had to. “It was difficult to successfully do search and rescue because the streets were damaged and the land was destroyed. I witnessed residents collecting rainwater in puddles along the damaged streets for water. Between cracks there would be puddles for water to be collected in plastic bags and that was how you drank water, out of the spout of a plastic bag. Entire neighborhoods were destroyed. There were no classes for children and in an urban disaster, the effect was that school just ended” says Camerio. 80% of schools and ½ of the hospitals collapsed. Even UN offices were destroyed, killing over 300 employees. 1.3 million residents in Haiti lost their homes. Camerio sighs, “the entire nation was in shock.” Yet, Camerio like Johnson says Haiti’s tradition to rebuild in the aftermath of disaster gave her hope for strengthening the nation.

Where is the empathy for cultural resiliency and what is struggle of its survival?
Carrefour, pronounced “ka-fou” in Haitian Creole, is a large metropolitan, low-income neighborhood in Eastern PAP where disaster recovery has been relatively unsuccessful. Immediately after the quake, it was speculated Carrefour’s residents were suffering from waterborne diseases. Thankfully, staff from Doctors Without Borders identified a need to support Carrefour and within 24 hours upon arrival to Haiti they set up a pop-up hospital to treat over 500 local residents. However, as the only medical clinic available for miles, it was sacked by corrupt criminal activity; stolen medical devices such as thermometers were sold on the streets. There were no schools or resource centers. There was not enough law enforcement. Carrefour remained in need of relief groups, but only received minimal efforts to secure emergency relief. Instead, the focus was development. Regional planning for pipeline projects like recreation centers and transportation systems exist to sustain a strong city. Formally, infrastructure policy should embody these blueprints. For disaster recovery, basic necessities such as search and rescue should have been organized first. Every international organization representative was certainly made aware of the lack of public safety with unacceptable high crime rates and the difficulty of locating displaced people. A need for extensive search and rescue should justify a plan for an immediate relief project since Haiti was in a state of emergency. Developers did not care about who was going to enjoy these facilities. Lacking empathy for the cultural survival of Haiti, emergency relief turned into a business enterprise. From Camerio’s perspective, there was no investment in the primary relief of the Haitian community including the survival of residents. Today, the outcome of funding pipeline projects over encouraging emergency relief has deprived Haiti of a full national recovery.

Changing Aid To Recognize Empathy UCHI: What is the University of California’s connection to recovery in Haiti?
Today, Haiti is swarming with anti-establishment small university charted aid groups including the University of California’s own UC Haiti initiative group. Partnered with the L’Universite d’Etat d’Haïti (UEH), Haiti’s largest public institution for higher education, each of the ten UC campuses has dedicated students to support “Haitian brothers and sisters.” The initiative, which began in 2010 as a response to the earthquake, emphasized the necessity for global collaboration in all sectors to support self-sufficient recovery for residents in Haiti. “International governments often do not prioritize higher education in their plans for reconstruction” says UCHI. However, now cross-cultural alliances between universities can ensure long-term stability. It is possible that UCHI may be the prospect to reversing the voice of aid back to support emergency relief. If smaller groups can increase international education infrastructure, then international organizations would have to respond to emergency relief. Facilitating self-sustainability for the Haitian people is a positive first step towards development rooted in empathy.

Image by United Nations Development Programme

WHERE ARE THE SLUMS IN CHINA?

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PROSPECT Journal is collaborating with China Focus, a blog focusing China’s role in the world and U.S.-China relations. As part of this collaboration, PROSPECT will be intermittently publishing articles by the China Focus bloggers. Our journal is excited to bring a wider range of expert analysis of Chinese politics, economics and culture to our readers.

By Yanning Wei
Contributing Writer

As of 2012, China’s rural to urban migration has reached a historic record: a total of 262 million migrants have moved to cities from the countryside. Many western observers and scholars hail China’s urbanization, as China’s cities have absorbed the largest ever influx of rural to urban migrants without the emergence of massive slums. Compared with megacities like Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro, Chinese megacities appear remarkably slum-free. But how did China avoid this problem?

In 2011, a UK-based scholar published a series of papers that ask whether a new geography of global poverty has developed.  His papers argue that the majority of the world’s poor live in the middle-income countries like India and China, rather than in low-income countries. In my research, I observe some distinctive facts about China.  First, poverty there is considered as a problem primarily associated with the rural population.  Second, according to the World Bank’s poverty line of $1.25 per day, as of 2009 there were 254 million Chinese who count as “extremely poor”.   At a poverty line of $2 per day, the poor population could have reached 394 million as of 2012.  Third, among migrants streaming to megacities such as Beijing and Shanghai, the majority comes from the countryside.

Given these facts, we can safely assume that at least a certain proportion of rural to urban migrants is pretty poor.  At this point, the puzzle is: if it is correct to say that then where is the space (e.g., slums) for them in the city? Or, simply put, where do the poor stay in the city?

Kam Wing Chan, professor of geography at the University of Washington, suggests that China’s rural migrants are “in the city but not of the city” because of China’s apartheid-like Hukou system, which creates “invisible walls” that prevent them from staying permanently in the city. Simply stated, under Hukou, rural migrants are allowed to work in the city. The city, however, is not responsible for providing social benefits for them. For example, migrant children typically were not allowed to attend local public schools until a few years ago. In addition, opportunities for migrants to change their rural Hukou status and permanently settle in the city are quite slim. For example, despite employing millions of rural migrants, Shanghai has only granted urban Hukou to 43 of them so far.

Constrained by the Hukou system, rural migrants have to keep circulating between their home villages and cities where informal housing is their only option. For many, this endless trip has lasted for decades and spanned generations. Even though there have been hundreds of millions of them, migrants in the cities are highly atomized and marginalized. This is the major reason why there are no expanding slums seen in the Chinese cities. For the government, however, the benefit of implementing Hukou is obvious. The system has enabled Chinese cities to obtained necessary laborers for economic growth and a busy, large and clean-looking city. At the same time, it lets cities avoid the costs of providing housing and other social services to rural migrants. It is the Hukou system that, for better or worse, has created China’s slum-free cities.

Photo by Pierre-Alexandre Pheulpin

PLAYING HOST TO THE WORLD CUP: PROMISED LOCAL BENEFITS TAKE A DIVE?

By Andrew Muse-Fisher
Staff Writer

Over the next eight years, the world will watch as Brazil, Russia and Qatar respectively host the World Cup. Though the money and labor that goes into the preparation of the world’s most viewed sporting event is ultimately used as a show of the strength and vitality of these nations, the efforts of these nations have exposed the individual issues that hinder their establishment or re-establishment of a positive global image. And as this trio works to rid themselves of the domestic problems within their own borders, they are also working towards the goals of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association. A closer look into the relationships of the host governments with its people and with FIFA reveals how the spirit of the World Cup is being pushed out by the search for profit and growth at the expense of the citizens of these countries.

In June of this year, the World Cup will commence in the country with a history of zeal for the sport. Brazil, whose five World Cup wins are the most by any country, began preparing in 2007 after its bid to host was approved by FIFA.[1] Naturally, the Brazilians celebrated this opportunity to develop infrastructure, increase health and education and reduce poverty within the country, just as the government promised in its campaign to win the bid. [2] The government, too, saw potential to reinforce Brazil’s developing economy. After two decades of economic growth that allowed Brazil to develop a strong economy, it has done little to sustain continued growth. [3] Brazil has relied on increased internal consumption in recent years, while simultaneously losing prospective outside investors. [4] This has slowed economic growth and has created a need to draw attention from the outside world to their potential for further development and possible investment. [5]

It is hardly surprising that they pursued the 2014 bid, but since they started preparing, they have put their need to attract foreign investment and global recognition before the needs of the Brazilian people, especially those living in the favelas. During the initial planning stages in 2010, the costs of building and renovating stadiums was estimated to cost 5.4 billion Brazilian Reais, or $2.3 billion. However, by 2013, the cost reached BRL 8 billion– $3.4 billion. [6] The total cost of the Cup stood at BRL 25.6 billion, or $10.8 billion. Unfortunately for Brazilian taxpayers, investors will cover only 15% of the total cost. [7] These costs only cover the expenses of staging the cup, and do nothing to fund improvements to healthcare, education or the reduction of poverty as Brazil promised to do in its winning bid. [8] This places the burden of the Cup largely on the citizens of Brazil, while they are receiving very little of what they were promised at the outset. In some cases, the government’s actions have directly contradicted their pledge to share the benefits of the World Cup with all Brazilians.

Though the country has experienced growth in recent years, a large amount of the Brazilian population still lives in slums or favelas. In order to construct roads necessary to connect the host cities, some residents of favelas were evicted with little notice and their homes were then demolished to make way for the infrastructure. [9] To follow this, the government raised public transportation prices. In response, 1.5 million Brazilians protested outside the last game of the Confederation Cup, a small-scale version of the World Cup, in June 2013. [10] Initial protests centered on the destruction of favelas and the price hike; they soon grew to include calls for greater urban mobility, and investment in health and education. [11] The protestors were met with tear gas and rubber bullets, and two protestors died in the chaos. [12] Shortly thereafter, the government announced promises to increase spending on urban mobility, while several cities retracted the increased transportation prices. [13] Though the government acted quickly to pacify the protestors, the question remains on whether they will act on their promises or if the government is simply trying to calm down dissatisfied Brazilians until the World Cup passes. If some of the most avid soccer fans in the world are too busy protesting to cheer on their team and country, Brazil will have a difficult time attracting positive attention.

On top of the obstacles Brazil has faced in allocating funds, it also has had trouble meeting deadlines, especially in terms of stadium construction. Though twelve stadiums were supposed to be built or renovated completely by 2012 in order to meet FIFA regulations, three of the stadiums were still under construction at the beginning of 2014. [14] These last-minute preparations have done little to alleviate the atmosphere of chaos in Brazil. Regardless of the amount of progress Brazil has made in the time allotted, they still had to restructure regulations in order to cut corners and meet deadlines set by FIFA. [15] That is, early on in the process, Brazil passed legislation that allows them to ignore certain environmental regulations in construction, while their debt limit was raised. [16] Both of these shortcuts suggest long term problems if Brazil does not take action to reverse the environmental and economic effects these might incur once the games are over. In other words, by putting FIFA’s guidelines before the demands of the public, while simultaneously searching for the support of investors, Brazil is potentially wasting an opportunity to ensure a strong future for both the economy and its people.

Four years after having hosted the winter Olympic games in Sochi, Russia will host the 2018 World Cup. Russia won the bid on the grounds that they do not currently have the infrastructure in place to hold the games, but do have the economic resources to establish this infrastructure. The decision was further sealed by the fact that Russia has experience in planning an event on such a large scale, partly because of their preparations for Sochi. It is indeed a win-win for both FIFA and Russia in that FIFA can have confidence in Russia’s ability to prepare, while Russia will get the much needed opportunity to strengthen its infrastructure. [17] Currently, Russia is constructing high-speed rails to connect cities with stadiums. While the government is paying 70% of the cost for the rails, it sees it as an endeavor with great potential to help create jobs and help the economy overall. [18] Even if the railways are not going to pay for themselves, the government is confident it will help to better connect the country. [19]

In addition to stitching the country together, Russia is also hoping to boost GDP from tourism from 2% to 7%. [20] The World Cup is, of course, a perfect opportunity to augment their tourism industry, but it also provides another chance for Russia to brush off the remaining parts of its image reminiscent of its communist days. By further opening itself to the world’s view, it can portray itself as a modern democracy and not a backwards regime, an image from which Russia is trying distance itself. [21] So far, Russia’s 15 billion Euro venture is remaining more or less free of complications, at least when compared to Brazil’s effort. [22]

That is not to say, however, that Russia has remained free of the drama that is typical of these processes. Similar to the discussions of Russian homophobia that were hot button issues before Sochi, there have been accusations of racism within the Russian soccer fan base. Black players playing for and against Russian teams have been subjected to racist chants and banners from the crowd. [23] Manchester city player, Yaya Toure, has gone so far as to call a protest within potential participants against the Russian World Cup. [24] Though Russia has ample time to recover from such incidents of racism, a protest by high-profile players could be detrimental to the success of Russia’s Cup and all it is trying to achieve by hosting it. [25]

At the same time, Russia is dealing with allegations of corruption in regards to its bid for the World Cup. While the country has denied these accusations, they have opened themselves up to an investigation. [26] This investigation was hindered as Michael Garcia, a representative of the FIFA ethics department, was denied access to the country for unrelated reasons. [27] Though these allegations may just be standard procedure, they stand to show the potential for corruption in an event where there is so much to be gained. If Russia continues steadily on its course to the 2018 World Cup, the games should go off without any major snags, and ultimately help Russia’s economy and image as intended. Russia, however, is not new to accusations of corruption or misconduct so there are no guarantees it will be able to emerge unscathed in the court of world opinion.

Beyond the horizon of Brazil and Russia lies the Qatar World Cup. Like Brazil and Russia, Qatar sees the World Cup as a prospect for increased economic activity and as a way to show the world its strength as a developing nation. The latter is especially important for the tiny oil rich country, as they strive to make a name for themselves that Brazil and especially Russia earned years ago. [28] In order to guarantee a successful Cup, Qatar has allocated around $100 billion for the games. [29] Regardless of this large sum of money, the country has been quick to cut costs, particularly when it comes to labor. Qatar has recruited migrant workers from several South East Asian countries to work on stadiums and infrastructure projects. [30] During the summer of 2013, nearly one worker died per day. [31] If workers continue dying at this rate, then around four thousand workers will be dead before the games start. [32] These deaths are largely attributed to the high temperatures, and minimal access to water and food in some cases. [33] The workers are also subjected to cramped living conditions, and job mobility is almost nonexistent because of contracts the workers agreed to in order to work in Qatar. [34] Though the majority of workers report decent working conditions, these extreme cases cannot be ignored. [35] Labor groups outside and within Qatar have called for FIFA to push the Qatari government to amend labor laws to prevent further instances of abuse, though it ultimately comes down to the government’s discretion on whether or not to do so. [36]

Simultaneously, the U.S. Treasury Department has released accusations that former members of the Qatar Football Association may have ties to Al Qaeda and Hamas. [37] Others closely tied to the selection process have been accused of anti-Semitic speech. [38] Though these may be a political smear campaigns on behalf of the United States, they may also represent racial and ethnic tensions that might form a roadblock later on in Qatar’s preparations. [39] A more prevalent issue facing Qatar’s hold on the World Cup is the possibility of corruption in the bidding process. [40] The FBI is currently investigating whether or not a member of FIFA accepted money from a Qatari company in order to secure the bid for Qatar. [41] Between abuse of the labor force, possible links to terror and corruption, and the fact that the Qatar is relatively far off, it is conceivable that the bid might be revoked from Qatar. This holds especially true if the corruption allegations are found to be legitimate. Though it is the farthest away of the three World Cups to come, the Qatar World Cup is already encountering complications that make it stand out as the most worrisome. Indeed, it not only highlights internal issues that Qatar must deal with or ignore, but it also implies either a weakness or neglectful attitude that allows such abuse and scandal to occur under the umbrella of FIFA.

Brazil, Russia and Qatar are three very different nations, but each stand to receive similar gains by hosting the World Cup. In order to host the games effectively, they need infrastructure to sustain such large crowds and the development of infrastructure can act as a boost to their growth. And if they pull off the games successfully, then the trio will be able to show the world their strength in resources and organization. While the individual governments know what they want to gain from hosting the World Cup, their populations also have wants and expectations from the process. Unfortunately, the motives of FIFA, the group that runs the games, trump the desires of citizens in hosting countries. Moreover, FIFA and host governments have more in common in what they are trying to achieve. This has in part caused the marginalization of the people that, ideally, should be receiving the benefits. Brazil has forgone attempts to increase access to education, healthcare and overall quality of life, especially to those with lower incomes, while construction and consulting firms are getting paid regardless of their slow pace. In Qatar, the benefits are not making their way down to those at the core of the process: laborers risk dying only to end up a statistic of the poorly planned preparations.

Of course, if these governments are successful in using the World Cup to strengthen their economies as planned, then the people will experience at least some of the profits. However, the long term benefits are not likely to be as direct or as effective as what they have demanded. If this holds true, then these countries are not utilizing the potential of the World Cup to the extent that they could to greatly aid those of all income levels, not just elite segments of society. And if it is the case that the gains of the World Cup are not distributed efficiently, then this raises questions about corruption in the sense that those in charge of the planning of the Cups can manipulate the effects in the favor of a select few. But there are questions that remain. Is this corruption caused, at least in part, by the demands set out by FIFA? And furthermore, does this corruption exist in these countries normally, or is it something that is only brought out in the spirit of the Cup? Regardless, as Brazil, Russia and Qatar each take the spotlight, they have the opportunity to show the world their strengths as a nation and to prove that they are above corruption, while simultaneously reinvigorating the spirit of the cup for both their underserved communities and avid soccer fans.

Photo by Catalytic Communities

Notes

[1] Carrión, Maria. “Brazil’s Poor Pay World Cup Penalty.” Progressive 77.7 (2013): 26. Master File Premier. Web. 5 Apr. 2014.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Taberer, Vivienne. “Brazil’s Economy Could Be Primed For A Comeback Going Into The World Cup.” Institutional Investor-International Edition (2013): 244. Business Source Complete. Web. 5 Apr. 2014.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Conti, Juan Pablo. “Brazil 2014 The Last-Minute World Cup.” Engineering & Technology (17509637) 9.2 (2014): 50-53. Academic Search Complete. Web. 5 Apr. 201 4.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Wahl, Grant. “The Two Brazils?” Sports Illustrated 120.9 (2014): 60. Master File Premier. Web. 5 Apr. 2014.
[9] Amaral, Marina and Natalia Viana. “Brazil Vs. The World Cup.” Nation 297.3/4 (2013): 6-8. Academic Search Complete. Web. 5 Apr. 2014.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Conti, Juan Pablo. “Brazil 2014 The Last-Minute World Cup.” Engineering & Technology (17509637) 9.2 (2014): 50-53. Academic Search Complete. Web. 5 Apr. 201 4.
[15] Amaral, Marina and Natalia Viana. “Brazil Vs. The World Cup.” Nation 297.3/4 (2013): 6-8. Academic Search Complete. Web. 5 Apr. 2014.
[16] Ibid.
[17] “From Russia With Love.” New African 501 (2010): 66. Master File Premier. Web. 6 Apr. 2014.
[18] “High Speed To The Urals.” Railway Gazette International 168.9 (2012): 39. Business Source Complete. Web. 6 Apr. 2014.
[19] Ibid.
[20] “From Russia With Love.” New African 501 (2010): 66. Master File Premier. Web. 6 Apr. 2014.
[21] Ibid.
[22] “Russia’s World Cup Set To Cost €15 Billion.” Construction Europe 24.7 (2013): 4. Business Source Complete. Web. 6 Apr. 2014.
[23] “From Russia With Love.” New African 501 (2010): 66. Master File Premier. Web. 6 Apr. 2014.
[24] “Yaya Toure Suggests Black Players Could Boycott 2018 Russia World Cup.” International Business Times 25 Oct. 2013: Regional Business News. Web. 6 Apr. 2014.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Interfax. “Russia Says Will Assist FIFA in Probing Bidding Campaign to Host 2018, 2022 World Cups.” Russia & FSU General News 07 Oct. 2013: 1. Regional Business News. Web. 6 Apr. 2014.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Rawlings, Nate. “Qatar Gets Scolded Yet Again For Migrant Worker Abuses.” Time.Com (2013): 1. Business Source Complete. Web. 6 Apr. 2014.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] “The World Cup Hosts in Bed with Terrorists.” Daily Mail 19 Mar. 2014: 72. Regional Business News. Web. 6 Apr. 2014.
[38] Ibid
[39] Ibid.
[40] “Call to Take World Cup off Qatar if Votes Were Bought.” Daily Mail 19 Mar. 2014: 73. Regional Business News. Web. 6 Apr. 2014.
[41] Ibid.