TERROR COMES TO CHINA: PART ONE

Turpan's Flaming Mountains

By Matthew Brown
Staff Writer

Robed horsemen navigate craggy mountain paths, laden with soviet era weapons and explosives. Their furtive eyes watch the sky for the bright glint of a surveillance drone. The fiery blast of a suicide bomber unites a national landmark and a remote desert village in a shared moment of tragedy. Heavily armed security forces patrol impoverished towns, glittering cities, and meandering highways on the hunt for an elusive foe. Masked operators break down the doors of a family home; the males inside are taken away, never to be seen again. From atop a clay brick minaret, a muezzin calls out the Adhan in a mournful voice that echoes across desert sands.

You would be forgiven for reading this and imagining some conflict-scarred country in the Middle East. Images like those above have become familiar to Western audiences, long exposed to the sights and sounds of the United States’ wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet this land of mujahideen, secret police, ethnic conflict, and ambiguous morality is actually China, specifically the administrative division called Xinjiang. It is here that the forces of radical Islam, ethnic identity, and nationalism collide head on with Chinese hegemony. China is entrenched in a campaign here that is known to the West as the Xinjiang Conflict, at least to those few who know of its existence. The Xinjiang Conflict has had a long, troubled history and in recent years the conflict has increased significantly. Unsurprisingly, little news of China’s own shadow war makes it off of the mainland. In this two part series, I will introduce you to the conflict itself and the geopolitical interests which prolong it. To foster some sense of familiarity with the region, we will first cover the land, people, and prizes found in this restless territory, whose very name (Xinjiang: an old frontier which returns recently) acknowledges the tensions lying below the surface. Part two will then examine the secessionist forces operating in the territory, their motivations and sponsors, and conclude with China’s response to an enduring struggle which has brought the war on terror to the very heart of Beijing.

Muztagh Ata

A Desert in the Sky

First, let us sort out our geography. Xinjiang is the largest Chinese administrative division, the equivalent to a state or province. In an already immense country, Xinjiang dominates; the entire nation of Iran could fit into the territory with room to spare. Located in the most northwestern portion of China, you could imagine it taking the shape of two large bowls pushed together. Where the rims touch, the region is divided by the Tian Shan mountain range, an austerely beautiful locale typical of the territory as a whole. The depression of the northern bowl is called the Dzungarian Basin and the southern depression is the Tarim Basin. Rimming the northern bowl are the Altay and Tarbagatai mountains. The southern bowl’s rim consists of the Altun, Kunlun, and Karakoram mountains. Besides the impressive mountain ranges, the other major geographical feature is the Taklimakan Desert of the Tarim Basin. It was along the perimeters of this extensive desert that the Silk Road split into its two main western routes. Climatically, this elevated region is primarily semi-arid or desert. The harsh weather, terrain, and seasons have confined the population to narrow bands of foothills at the bases of mountain ranges or near desert oases.

Map of Xinjiang's Location in China

Xinjiang’s size and its location at the very edge of the People’s Republic of China has created a long, winding border. The nations of Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Chinese administrative division of Tibet all share a mountainous border with Xinjiang. Details of just where China ends and another country begins are somewhat vague. China and India both stake claims to the Chinese held Aksai Chin region, while Pakistan, India, and China each claim the Chinese held Shaksgam Valley. Much like the Kashmir question between Pakistan and India, these border disputes are frozen conflicts where little progress towards reconciliation has been made. These locations often contain important mountain passes critical for future transit projects. For obvious reasons, control of these key land routes in and out of China are of central importance to all parties involved.

Native Sons

As noted before, the scarcity of water in the region has confined the major population centers to narrow belts at the base of the mountain ranges, where the yearly snow melt can be easily utilized. Extensive irrigation networks have transformed these settled areas into productive agricultural zones that stretch the entire length of each mountain range. These belts are home to the majority of the 21.8 million citizens of Xinjiang. Ürümqi, the capital, is the largest city with 3 million citizens residing in the rapidly modernizing metropolis. The nine other major cities, many of which have histories dating to before the adventures of Marco Polo, are home to a plurality of ethnic groups. Of these groups the Uyghur, the Han, and the Kazakhs are by far the largest.

Map of Xinjiang's Ethnic Groups

Uyghurs, the most numerous group, make up 43 percent of the population and have the longest history of settlement in the region. They are a Turkic speaking group with a unique mixture of Mediterranean and Asian genetic descent. Although their early history is disputed, mostly for political reasons, some form of Uyghur population has lived in the region for about 4,000 years and have attained and lost power over the region as history dictates. Historically, the southwestern Tarim Basin has been the region these people call home. Uyghurs are almost exclusively dedicated to the Sunni branch of Islam. Since completing their conversion in the 17th century, several famous mosques have been erected.

The next largest group consists of the Han people, who make up 40 percent of the population. Han history in the region is almost as complex as that of the Uyghurs; the two are linked by a long chain of violent conflicts. Major Han immigration to the region occurred following the Qing Dynasty’s 18th century conquests, and another large wave in recent years. These people share a common culture with the ethnic Hans who populate most of China. Mostly Buddhist, the Han retain strong economic and family ties with China’s heartland. Since the Qing Dynasty conquests and subsequent waves of immigration, the Han have mostly settled in the northern Dzungarian Basin, with the exception of a few cities in the Tarim Basin.

Lastly are the Kazakhs, who inhabit the most northern regions of Xinjiang. Forming approximately eight percent of the population, they are practicing Shi’a Muslims of the Ismaili sect. Significant cultural links between the Xinjiang Kazakhs and their brothers to the north in Kazakhstan make these people an island of eastern Turkic culture. Besides the Kazakhs, the Han, and the Uyghurs, 14 other ethnic populations, such as Tajiks and Russians, also share the land.

A PetroChina gas station in Xinjiang

Treasure, Trade and Transport

Natural gas extraction in Xinjiang is by far the most dominant feature of the economy and is of crucial importance to Chinese energy security. Over 25 percent of China’s natural gas is supplied by Xinjiang via the West-East Gas Pipeline, which spans 4,000 miles and terminates in the metropolis of Shanghai. A volume of 420 billion cubic feet of natural gas passes through this pipeline annually. Such monumental numbers has required the completion of equally titanic engineering projects in the Tarim and Dzungarian natural gas plays. The northern city of Karamay, which means ‘black oil’ in the Uyghur tongue, is the center of Dzungarian natural gas industry, while Aksu in the Tarim Basin is the southern counterpart. Ethnically, Aksu is split more or less equally between Uyghur and Han populations while Karamay is 80 percent Han.

Coal, Xinjiang’s next leading energy export, is of similar importance to natural gas for the region. Over 38 percent of China’s estimated coal reserves are deposited in near-surface level banks that make for easy extraction. Although the exploitation of these coal deposits lag behind the natural gas efforts, conservative estimates predict that 800 million tons of coal will be extracted from Xinjiang every year by 2020 C.E. These huge deposits are mostly located in the Dzungarian Basin, but a very large coal bank also exists in the Tarim Basin as well.

The natural wealth locked within the ground of Xinjiang includes valuable minerals as well. Iron, salt, beryllium, rare earth metals, and 48 other valuable ores have been discovered and exploited to varying degrees all across the region. Extraction of these minerals has a long history in the region and many current mines have expanded upon earlier exploitations from antiquity. Agriculture is surprisingly productive for such an arid region, thanks to centuries of irrigation projects. Large amounts of grain and fruit are grown in the region for distribution to the rest of China.

All of these economic efforts rely upon huge amounts of water, which is naturally the one scarce resource in Xinjiang. Competition for water rights is a divisive issue; local farmers, mining corporations, and neighboring countries all compete for access to the few reservoirs available. To mitigate this issue, neighboring Tibet has been pegged as a possible source of much needed water; several recent engineering projects have been proposed to divert water from the Yarlung Zangbo River of Tibet.

Of course, all of these goods must find a route to market. Exports leaving China through Xinjiang total $19.3 billion per year, while imports are approximately $5.9 billion per year. Many of the manufactured items and foodstuffs produced in China must pass through Xinjiang on their way to Eurasian consumers. The same Silk Road routes that generations of merchants used before have now grown to accommodate unprecedented traffic. A vast majority of these goods pass through the city of Horgos, located in the northwest portion of the Dzungarian Basin. A ‘land port’ that abuts Kazakhstan, the Chinese side has been the site of rapid modernization and expansion. Conversely, the Kazakh portion is positively anachronistic; remove the cars and telephone wires and you have a medieval village. Thanks to extensive investment, Horgos has become the most vital transit point for Chinese goods headed to Eurasia and beyond. All of this trade is facilitated by an extensive transportation network. Numerous highways, railways and several large airports have been constructed in a short period of time and many more are planned. As China continues to extensively invest in development of its neighbors economies, the needs of Eurasian consumers can only grow. So too will the roads into and out of China.

They Call It Peace

With this overview of Xinjiang’s geography, people, and resources now complete, we are now ready to delve into the Xinjiang conflict armed with knowledge of the greater context forthcoming events will take place in. The strategic location of Xinjiang, its extensive supply of vital natural resources, and its large ethnic Han population sum up to a prize that China simply cannot afford to lose. Necessity, as we will see, compels the Chinese government to retaliate swiftly and brutally to any threat to regional stability. Yet, as the United States has learned, ruthlessness and firepower often create more of the very enemies you hope to eliminate. Up next; diplomacy or jihad, democracy or autocracy, the battle for supremacy amongst secessionist groups pits them against each other almost as much as against China. Plus, clandestine operations and knife wielding maniacs.

Cover photo by Colegota

Authors of additional images linked here, in order of appearance: Muztagh Ata photo by Colegota; Map of Xinjiang’s location by TUBS; Map of Xinjiang ethnicities by QuartierLatin1968; Gas Station photo by Otebig

BLOG: VIOLENCE STRIKES KUNMING

I’ve always considered Kunming one of my favorite cities in China. After all, many of my relatives live in the provincial capital of southwestern China’s Yunnan province. In the past, every thought of the city brought back memories of fresh air, clear skies, easy-going people and delicious food. They don’t call Kunming the City of Eternal Spring for no reason. But last Saturday, a horrid act tainted those memories. Last Saturday, the streets of Kunming ran red with blood. Last Saturday, its people cowered in fear behind locked doors. Last Saturday, a separatist struggle largely limited to China’s distant northwest came swooping down with a vengeance.

At 9:20 p.m. local time, six men and two women clad in black stormed the crowded ticket lobby of Kunming’s train station. Brandishing swords and cleavers, they began to hack indiscriminately at bystanders, slaughtering those who could not flee. Neither the old nor the young were spared. Many were impoverished migrant workers planning to spend the night in the waiting rooms. In less than twenty minutes, the assailants killed 29 people and wounded another 143. Those numbers are sure to increase by the time of publication. Images circulating around social media show bloodstained floors and abandoned baggage left by their terrified owners. In the chaos, police managed to kill four suspects and capture one injured female. On March 3, authorities arrested the remaining three suspects, bringing an end to China’s worst case yet of domestic terrorism in the 21st century.

Authorities quickly identified the attackers as separatists from northwest China’s restive Xinjiang region. The region is of vital importance to China. It borders Mongolia, Russia, several Central Asian republics, Pakistan and India, making it a useful springboard for projecting Chinese influence abroad. [1] At one-sixth of China’s landmass, it is the country’s largest administrative division, as well as a major population safety valve for resettling Han Chinese from central China. [2] In addition, Xinjiang possesses an abundance of natural resources critical to China’s economic growth. The region produces one-third of China’s cotton and possesses the country’s largest oil and gas reserves. [3] Most of China’s uranium, significant coal deposits, as well as its nuclear weapons testing site are also located in Xinjiang.

Xinjiang is home to the Uighurs, a Turkic ethnic minority. Like their Tibetan counterparts to the south, Uighurs have long called for autonomy from the rest of China. I am no stranger to Xinjiang, its people and its issues. My grandparents taught chemistry at the university in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s regional capital. My father went to school and grew up alongside Uighurs. But those were different times. The last few decades have seen a surge of Han migrants to Xinjiang. Their numbers rose from 300,000 in 1953 to six million in 1990. By 2000, Han Chinese accounted for 41 percent of Xinjiang’s the population. [4] The influx of Han settlers placed massive strains on Xinjiang’s Uighurs, who view the Han as a threat to their culture and well-being. Though they benefit from affirmative action policies, the majority of Xinjiang’s Uighurs fare badly relative to their Han counterparts. There is a clear disparity between Han and Uighurs. Coupled with heavy-handed government policies, discrimination and the rise of radical Islam, calls for independence and instances of violence have steadily increased in number and scope in the last few years.

What separates the bloodshed in Kunming from previous incidents is the location. In the past, most incidents, such as the deadly 2009 Urumqi riots, took place within Xinjiang’s boundaries and far away from the rest of China. The Kunming massacre represents an escalation in the struggle for Uighur autonomy. Previous attacks outside of Xinjiang such as last year’s incident at Tiananmen Square were nowhere close to the Kunming massacre in terms of scope and magnitude.

It is unclear, however, if these attacks are the product of small cells or a larger organization. Chinese authorities have long referred to the existence of terrorist organizations such as the East Turkestan Liberation Organization and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the latter on its list of terrorist organizations for alleged connections with Al-Qaeda. But the true extent of these organizations’ capabilities is unknown. For all we know, the government may have overstated their capabilities to shield itself from criticism of its human rights abuses.

While the Kunming massacre won’t warrant a response on par with that of the United States after 9/11, China must prepare itself for future attacks. At the same time, the government and its people must find better ways to address the grievances of the Uighurs. But all of that can come at a later time. Now is the time to grieve for the dead and pray for the wounded.

1. Chung, Chien-peng. “China’s ‘War on Terror’: September 11 and Uighur Separatism.” Foreign Affairs 81.4 (2002): 8-12. JSTOR. Web. 11 October 2012.

2. Dwyer, Arienne. The Xinjiang Conflict: Uighur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse. Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2005. Print. Policy Studies 15.

3. Chung, Chien-peng. “China’s ‘War on Terror’: September 11 and Uighur Separatism.” Foreign Affairs 81.4 (2002): 8-12. JSTOR. Web. 11 October 2012.

4. Dwyer, Arienne. The Xinjiang Conflict: Uighur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse. Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2005. Print. Policy Studies 15.