THE BEAR POKES BACK: RUSSIA, ABKHAZIA, AND NATO HEADACHES

Abkhazian People Wave the Flag of Abkhazia

By Matthew Brown
Staff Writer

On Nov. 24, 2014, Russia and Abkhazia signed a historic cooperation treaty, accomplishing yet another fait accompli that NATO and its allies seem unable to answer. The “Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia on Alliance and Integration” formalizes Russia’s security and economic partnership with the breakaway region of Abkhazia. It is set to run for 10 years with the hopes to extend it for a further five years after that. The most significant aspects of this treaty include: Russian and Abkhaz military assets in the region will merge into a joint security force led by a Russian commander; a common security agreement between Russia and Abkhazia (i.e. an attack on one will be considered an attack on the other); a substantial increase in Russian economic aid to Abkhazia to the tune of 12 billion rubles ($222 million); a commitment on Russia’s part to acquire international recognition for Abkhazia; and a streamlined process towards Russian citizenship for Abkhazian residents. It should be clear from the depth of these commitments that Russia is committed to the continued security and development of the Abkhazian state and pays little regard to Georgian and Western objections. The Balkanization of Georgia is a key part of Russia’s foreign policy in the region and Abkhazia is likely only the first step in this process; the breakaway region of South Ossetia is rumored to be in talks to sign a similar treaty with Russia in the near future. Western interests will now have a much more difficult time reconstituting the former borders of Georgia.

Abkhazia has existed in an unacknowledged, twilight state of affairs since its violent beginning. Formally recognized only by Russia and under pressure from NATO to rejoin the nation of Georgia, uncertainty has been the defining theme for the decades-old nation of Abkhazia. The roots of this limbo grow from the chaotic dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. It was with the final collapse of the Soviet Union that allowed for the ethnic Georgians to create their own nation, but in the years leading up to the collapse, the ethnic Abkhaz people began agitating against the state of Georgia’s calls for independence, correctly fearing that a Georgian state would seek to absorb the weaker Abkhazian region. The key port city of Sukhumi and valuable transit routes to Turkey and beyond would be a great boon for the fledgling Georgian nation. The ethnic Abkhazian and Ossetian populations, along with their territory, were ultimately ceded to the Georgian nation by the Soviet Union, creating an uneasy coexistence. The establishment of a joint power sharing agreement with the Abkhaz people temporarily defused tensions. Unfortunately, hardline ethnic Georgian politicians eroded Abkhazian representation and the situation deteriorated, ultimately culminating with the Georgian invasion of Sukhumi and subsequent ethnically motivated pillaging, rape, and murder. The 1992-93 War in Abkhazia followed, and, with Russian support, Abkhazia achieved de facto independence from Georgia but failed to gain widespread international recognition. Russian troops have been stationed along the borders ever since and Russian economic aid has become essential for the nation’s continued existence. Indeed, the closeness of the ties between these regions is demonstrated by the fact that 90 percent of all Abkhazian citizens hold a Russian passport. In more recent times, Georgia has been dissuaded from uniting these regions by force. The disastrous outcome of the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 proved that Georgia does not have the military capacity to reconquer its lost territory, and that it cannot expect NATO forces to come to their aid.

Returning to the recent strategic partnership, Georgian opinions on the new treaty are, as to be expected, negative. For Georgia this treaty is hardly unexpected, yet a catastrophe all the same. The terms of the treaty greatly strengthen Abkhazia’s security position vis-á-vis Georgia and will give Abkhazia little reason to return to negotiations on reunification with Georgia. The economic and political benefits Russian extends in this treaty provide boons that Georgia cannot hope to match at the negotiation table. For now, Georgia will have to accept a Russian victory. While not a formal annexation, as with Crimea earlier this year, Russia now has de facto control of the Abkhaz territory, along with Abkhazia’s warm water port on the Black Sea in Sukhumi. A cursory glance at a map of the region will show that Russia is now in the enviable position of exerting control over a good third of the Black Sea coastline. In addition to this territorial gain, Russia makes further headway in solidifying transit routes for goods traded through the Eurasian Economic Union. None of these gains will play out in favor of NATO or the EU; this treaty can represent nothing other than a strategic defeat in both the political and economic arenas of the South Caucasus.

In the West, news of these developments has been largely ignored. After all, one does not enjoy relaying news of their defeat. Hesitant steps towards rebalancing the situation have been taken though. The official U.S. response has been twofold. On the political front, the U.S. State Department has issued press releases reiterating their position that the U.S. does not recognize Abkhazia as a sovereign state and therefore does not recognize any treaties between it and Russia. Beyond reinforcing the historic position of the U.S. in relation to Abkhazia’s situation, these communiqués accomplish little else. The military response has been more discreet, yet potentially more substantial. It has been reported that U.S. military officials are engaging in talks with the Georgian Defense Ministry with the aim to procure greater numbers of weapons and advanced capabilities for the Georgian Army. Georgia has long sought to obtain lethal anti-air and anti-tank capabilities from the U.S., while the U.S. has been reluctant to encourage further military conflict in the region at the risk of provoking a forceful response from the Kremlin. However, the deterioration of Georgia’s strategic position in the region may just be the event needed to make the U.S. relent.

What does the future hold for the region as a consequence of this treaty? The most immediate and likely development will be the signing of a similar treaty between Russia and South Ossetia. Russia cannot help but notice the lack of a significant response from the U.S. or Europe and will be emboldened to press their advantage. Further down the line, treaties such as this one will possibly pave the way for greater economic development in the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia is determined to connect Iranian energy and industrial exports to Eurasian and European markets. One of Russia’s most important projects in this regard involves the construction of railways linking the Caucasus and Iran with Turkey. Routes going through Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Armenia, and Turkey are all in various stages of planning. Yet many of these routes face a common obstacle; Georgia’s refusal to finalize approval for projects crossing through its territory. If Russia can succeed in forcing Georgia to capitulate on this position, either through utilizing the threats of losing Abkhazia and South Ossetia or through further Balkanization, Russia will achieve a significant economic objective in the greater Central Asian region.

Image by Apsuwara

DEBATING THE “UKRAINIAN PROBLEM”: WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO? (PART II)


Following former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s recent comments on how to approach the “Ukrainian Problem,” two writers of Prospect Journal debate the merits of hard and soft power in dealing with Russia’s actions in Crimea. This is the second article in a two-part series. Part I can be viewed here.

By Patrick Johnson
Staff Writer

We really need to start trusting in international institutions. That’s what this debate ultimately comes down to. When Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice criticizes Obama for leaving a “power vacuum,” she cannot do so without simultaneously devaluing the international institutions that can fill that void. Rice’s speech critiquing the “American Withdrawal” is a typically hawkish attitude. She views the world in the Cold-War mindset: a zero-sum game that is won or lost on the basis of hard (read: military) power. Not only is this a flawed understanding of the Crimean situation, it is an archaic policy that will, like a self-fulfilling prophecy, drag us back to the Cold War.

President Vladimir Putin, and every other world leader for that matter, does not view us as weak. Rather, he has a very nuanced understanding of American interests, of what we’ll fight over, and what we won’t. We won’t go to war for Crimea. Putin knows this, and operates according to Russian interests regardless of who is sitting in the Oval Office. Remember, U. S. foreign policy has remained largely unchanged since World War II.

Nor is Obama by any measure a weak president. He has ordered 50 times more drone strikes than his predecessor, President George W. Bush. Yes he has strengthened international alliances and focused on rebuilding American soft power, but these were measures necessitated by the policy catastrophes Rice herself helped to orchestrate. Not intervening in Syria, the go-to example of American “weakness” that war hawks embrace as proof of their claim, is actually a poor example. Intervening in Syria was never a clear case for U.S. military intervention, but a veritable quagmire, complicated by a very jumbled picture on the ground, and a host of conflicting regional parties and interests–not intervening was a demonstration of proper restraint and sheer prudence.

The reality is exactly the opposite of Rice’s view that this invasion is unprovoked. When the U.S.S.R fell, President Bush Senior promised President Mikhail Gorbachev that the U.S. would not take advantage of Russian weakness, and that we would incorporate them into the international system. This proved false, and NATO has steadily expanded its membership right to the borders of Russia, including Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Now, like a caged animal, Russia is lashing out against expanding U.S. influence and strength.

Stop and listen to Putin’s speeches and this becomes immediately evident. Putin announced to a cheering crowd that he would no longer stand Western aggression. I’m not arguing that the Crimean seizure was legal or justified, but perhaps it was more reactionary to Western actions than Rice suggests.

Rice correctly points out that Ukrainian independence was guaranteed after 1990, when they voluntarily gave up nuclear weapons. Yet we should not be so callous as to deny Russia a sphere of influence, especially when we have had a sphere of influence that included the entire Western Hemisphere since the Monroe Doctrine. Independence and influence is simply a paradox in the 21st century with which states must learn to deal.

Rice uses the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia to illustrate her argument: the problem is, she gets it wrong. She uses the example as a case when Putin was aggressive, but vigorous American action rebuffed him. What a terrible example to offer. It shows that Putin was willing to invade even with Bush’s hawkish administration in power, and with a much larger military budget. Moreover, Putin was not entirely rebuffed. 1/5th of Georgian territory is still firmly in Russian control. The takeaway from this example should be that Russia is willing and able to control neighboring territory, regardless of who is president, or whether they project hard or soft power appropriately.

So let’s trust international institutions and soft power. Deny Russia a seat at the G8 summit, and form an international coalition (that includes China) to denounce these actions. Russia may not break over such measures, but it will bend. Invest energy in helping Kiev consolidate power in reforming the state in order to stabilize Ukraine’s currently tumultuous situation. And ultimately recognize that this situation does not herald the end of U.S. supremacy on the world stage or prove the existence of a power vacuum. It is the result of a defeated rival being continuously threatened, and now lashing out.

Putin’s actions should be vigorously resisted and, more critically, reversed. But so should Rice and her hardline critique. Her criticisms confuse the causes of the Crimean invasion and dilute American involvement. What’s worse, they threaten a return to Cold War policies. If Rice had her way, the defense budget would continue to expand, and America would police the world with a metallic fist. I challenge America to be smarter than every other superpower in world history. The U.S. must value international institutions that can solve global conflicts, just as it must figure out a way to operate and exert global influence independent of pure military strength. Otherwise, as new powers emerge, we may find ourselves with policies suited to 1914, not 2014.

Photo by poniblog

DEBATING THE “UKRAINIAN PROBLEM”: WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO? (PART I)


Following former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s recent comments on how to approach the “Ukrainian Problem,” two writers of Prospect Journal debate the merits of hard and soft power in dealing with Russia’s actions in Crimea. This is the first article in a two-part series.

By Bijan Mehryar
Staff Writer

Whether the United States should or should not be the world’s superpower does not change the facts on the ground. When protesters from around the world clamor for American support, it is because of what America represents to these people. When Russia invaded the Crimean peninsula in blatant violation of international law, America’s tepid response indicated that we were not going to put up a strong enough fight for the Ukrainian people who had risen to overthrow the Yanukovych government. The fact of the matter is that the Obama administration has pursued a soft power strategy where hard power is needed. Rice is right in advocating for a nuanced post-cold war mindset, because Putin is very much a leader who is attempting to reclaim the prestige and eminence lost by Russia since the early 1990s.

In the span of a couple weeks, Russian troops amassed on the Russian-Ukrainian border, entered Crimea, took control of the peninsula and annexed it within the context of a referendum and treaty that have been widely criticized by the international community. However, the international community has issued no ultimatum to Russia. By March 26 the Russian flag had been raised in all of the 193 military bases in Crimea following the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops. Despite a recent meeting in Paris between Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, the debate over what will become of the annexation is still unresolved with Russia demanding Ukrainian constitutional reform and greater autonomy from Kiev for ethnic Russian regions.

While Obama has excelled in other areas of his foreign policy, such as the use of the drone strike program to eliminate terrorists, he has far too often painted a picture of himself as having to catch up with international events, not leading the change the world needs in affairs such as this. The Iranian protests of 2009, the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, the Syrian civil war and now the annexation of Crimea, all exemplify how America has been unable to effectively promote and protect its interests. Obama, if he wishes to solve this process, cannot go about in a tit-for-tat sanctions game against Russia. Rather he needs a combination of demonstrative military force in the name of protecting Ukrainian sovereignty, and stalwart international condemnation to make Putin scale down the conflict. This is not to say that a rigorous sanctions regime should not be used at all, but rather that these sanctions should not be the only tool for solving these situations. Time and time again we have learned that sanctions, unless pursued for decades, like in the case of Iran, do not lead to immediate turnarounds in policy.

Putin has a long history of aggressive action. This is a man who lived through the defeat of his nation at the hands of the West, and piece-by-piece he is attempting to rebuild and strengthen the Russian sphere of influence. On principle, a strong Russia is not necessarily a bad thing, but when that strength becomes the means by which other nations are threatened and conquered then we must, in the strongest ways possible, move against such unchecked expansionism. Putin did this once with Georgia, then with Crimea and now he is using the situation in Crimea to negotiate for the support of a breakaway Russian state in Moldova. Men like Putin only understand one thing – power. He is a strongman who needs to be strong-armed back into place and be taught that in the 21st century, you cannot use pieces of other countries as means to rebuild a collection that you lost 24 years ago.

Photo by poniblog